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Poverty amid plenty: 
Structural violence and local governance in Western Congo 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has drawn sharp criticism 
regarding the model of liberal peacebuilding employed in the country.  Critics emphasise the 
importance of local ownership of peacebuilding mechanisms at sub-national as well as national levels.  
This raises questions in relation to the popular legitimacy and efficacy of local mechanisms.   
 
Drawing on field research conducted in the relatively affluent province of Bas-Congo in Western 
Congo, this article highlights a lack of popular legitimacy for provincial level political authority 
within the province stemming from an acute marginalisation of the population from local structures of 
power and wealth.  The article also demonstrates the inefficacy of more local, village and 
neighbourhood-based political structures which, aimed at conflict mitigation rather than 
transformation, ignore the structural roots of local conflicts and do little to counteract the growing 
social distrust, conflict and disintegration within local communities.   
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo; structural violence; local governance; conflict; 
liberal peacebuilding 
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Introduction 
The protracted conflict in the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
has drawn much academic attention.  While many contributions have focussed on the 
dynamics of the conflict itself (Reed 1998; Clark 2001; International Crisis Group 2003; Tull 
2003; Beswick 2009; UN 2010), others point to the failure of the liberal peacebuilding model 
aimed at bringing an end to conflict within the East as well as across the country more 
broadly (Englebert and Tull 2008; Eriksen 2009; Autesserre 2010; Marriage 2011; Prunier 
2011; Trefon 2011; Larmer et al 2013).  A considerable number of flaws with the 
peacebuilding approach employed have been identified.  These include its elite level focus 
which, some argue, has strengthened the power of rebels and combatants and increased the 
vulnerability and insecurity of the population (Engelbert and Tull 2008; Eriksen 2009; 
Marriage 2011); its Western institutional bias (Engelbert and Tull 2008); its assumption of 
common rather than competing interests (Marriage 2011); and although, at $8.7 billion, the 
most expensive UN peacekeeping operation to date, its resource deficiencies (Englebert and 
Tull 2008; Eriksen 2009; Trefon 2013).   Many commentators criticise peacekeepers’ failures 
to address the local drivers and structural causes of conflict (Kisangani 2006, 2010; Engelbert 
and Tull 2008; Autesserre 2010; Trefon 2011; Larmer et al 2013).  Kisangani (2010) argues 
that popular sentiments of social and economic exclusion across the country amplify local 
grievances while Marriage (2011, 1905) argues that international interventions have 
increased the insecurity of the population as ‘patterns of extraction that were established 
through violence are perpetuated within a political economy that has received international 
endorsement’.   
 
3 
 
A common theme running through many of these contributions is the importance of local 
ownership, autonomy and control of peacebuilding initiatives and processes at national and 
sub-national levels.  While this echoes a popular theme within the broader literature also (see, 
for example, Donais 2009, 2012), what this means in practice (ownership of what exactly and 
by who?) remains complex.  A number of commentators (Marysse 2005; Liègeois 2009; 
Barrios and Ahamed 2010; Ngoma-Binda et al 2010; Tull 2010 and Wedi-Djamba 2012) and 
an increasing number of international donors disenchanted with the neo-patrimonial, 
predatory politics of the central regime (2013, ints.) identify a role for decentralised political 
institutions in this regard.  Given reported correlations between decentralisation and increased 
local conflict and tension however (Lake and Rothchild 2005; Siegle and O’Mahoney 2008), 
a concomitant shift to local level political structures and processes raises new sets of 
questions in relation to the popular legitimacy and efficacy of these local mechanisms – an 
area which, as Putzel et al (2008) have noted, there is currently little knowledge.  Specific 
questions include the following:  What are the roles and functions of local institutions?  How, 
if at all, do local individuals and communities interact with these?  How, if at all, do these 
institutions respond to the needs and priorities of their communities?  Overall, how 
responsive and legitimate are local institutions and authorities?   
 
These questions form the basis for this article which draws from relevant policy and field 
research on local governance in Bas-Congo province in Western DRC.  Bas-Congo makes for 
an interesting case study because, as well as being relatively understudied, as the second 
wealthiest province in the country, it is ideal for examining the local impact of the elite level 
spoils politics identified in the literature.  While not the site of large-scale conflict and 
violence, Bas-Congo is home to the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) – a politico-religious 
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movement which, exploiting local tensions and perceptions of marginalisation and 
exploitation, led a series of popular protests against the state in the late 2000s (see Tull 2010).  
Given what we now know about the roots of large-scale conflicts lying in such local tensions 
and frustrations (see Galtung 1969; World Bank 2011), Bas-Congo is an ideal case for 
examining such micro-level dynamics as potential precursors to more widespread conflict 
and unrest.  Field research was conducted in 2013 across 12 diverse sites (selected to reflect 
variety across urban and rural settings, socio-economic contexts and levels of low-lying 
conflict), each located within a 30 kilometre radius of Matadi and Tshela towns.  Semi-
structured interviews with 103 randomly selected residents1 (51 female; 52 male), 24 focus 
groups (FGs - 12 female, 12 male, each with between 8-12 participants), and nine semi-
structured interviews with local authorities were conducted in total within the province.  In 
addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2013 and 2014 with national and 
provincial ministry officials, national and provincial non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
representatives, and international donor representatives.  Focus group and interview 
transcripts were coded following the fieldwork and the data was processed through SPSS to 
allow for some descriptive statistical analysis.  Three findings are presented and discussed 
within this article.  First, while there is very little support for the Kinshasa regime in the 
traditional oppositional province of Bas-Congo, the provincial government also enjoys a very 
low level of popular legitimacy.  This, it is argued, is due to the acute marginalisation of the 
population from local structures of power and wealth as provincial authorities, embedded in 
Kinshasa-based networks, facilitate the extraction of resources and rents out of the province 
rather than serving and servicing their own constituents.  Second, more local village and 
neighbourhood-based political structures, which are largely unchanged since those of the 
Mobutu era, also appear to have low levels of legitimacy.  Communities and individuals often 
opt to resolve communal problems and conflicts between themselves where at all possible 
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rather than resorting to local political authorities which, aimed at conflict mitigation rather 
than transformation, ignore the structural roots and drivers of local conflict.  And third, the 
consequences of this continued political and economic marginalisation of the local population 
is a growing social distrust, conflict and disintegration within local communities.  As wealth 
and poverty sit side by side in an uneasy and frequently inflammatory co-existence, and with 
no effective political channels for escalating popular anger and frustration, the propensity for 
more widespread violence is increasing.  Given the proven links between exclusion and 
popular mobilisation (Galtung 1969; Baaz and Stern 2008; Kisangani 2010; World Bank 
2011), the findings highlight the need for more responsive and inclusive local institutions 
aimed at the transformation rather than the management of structural violence and the 
conflict this engenders.  The article is structured as follows. 
 
The following section examines the apparent paradox between wealth and poverty within 
Bas-Congo province and draws from interviews and FGs to highlight communities’ principle 
priorities.  Section three again draws from both interviews and FGs, as well as from an 
analysis of both the relevant decentralisation laws and Bas-Congo’s provincial development 
plan, to explore the reasons for this paradox.  Section four turns to more local levels of 
governance – both formal and informal – within the province and examines the efficacy of 
these in resolving local problems and conflicts as identified by communities themselves.  The 
article concludes by highlighting the failure of elite liberal peacebuilding approaches for the 
population of Bas-Congo and argues that, as long as decentralisation continues to serve as an 
institutionalisation of spoils politics rather than the downwardly accountable, participative 
process envisaged by its proponents, the lack of political outlets for the structural violence 
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thus engendered leaves no option but for more large-scale conflict in a region largely ignored 
by donors and the international development community.   
 
 
Bas-Congo: The paradox of poverty amid plenty 
Situated to the West of Kinshasa on the Atlantic Ocean, Bas-Congo is the smallest province 
in the country although, within the new 26 provincial configuration, it is the largest mono-
ethnic one2.  With a population of approximately 4.5 million, Bas-Congo is endowed with 
vast mineral resources (diamonds, gold, bauxite, phosphate, rock salt, oil shale, manganese, 
marble, alluvium).  It is also the country’s only oil-producing area, producing three billion 
barrels per annum with an estimated one billion barrels of reserves. According to the 
International Crisis Group (2012), Bas-Congo is financially more important to the country 
than Katanga due to its high level of oil production, although disputes are ongoing over 
offshore exploitation blocks between Kinshasa and Luanda (Trefon 2013, 148). Oil generated 
more than $320 million in tax revenue for the country in 2010, the most recent year for which 
figures are available (EITI 2012, 32). Bas-Congo is also the site of the vast Inga hydroelectric 
dam which has been billed as having the power to electrify the entire continent3.  There is a 
railway line between Matadi and Kinshasa and the country’s only ports, Matadi, Boma and 
Banana, through which nearly all manufactured goods reach Kinshasa, are located in the 
Province (ADB 2009). These economic assets combine to make Bas-Congo the second 
largest contributor to the national budget (Liégeois 2009, 11),   
 
These assets notwithstanding, poverty is widespread and growing across the province with a 
poverty rate close to 70% reported in 2009 (ADB 2009).  While unemployment is estimated 
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at just 1.4 per cent, 76 per cent of Bas-Congolese work in subsistence agriculture, with just 
14 per cent reported to be in informal, non-agricultural activity (PNUD 2009, 5).  Moreover, 
surveys indicate that poverty is very significant in all categories of households with 79 per 
cent of households where the main earner is working in the private sector in poverty; 72 per 
cent of households where the main earner is in the public sector; and 71 per cent where the 
main earner is in subsistence agriculture (PNUD 2009, 6).  Education is characterised by low 
primary and secondary enrolment rates and infrastructure in a very advanced state of 
dilapidation and disrepair.  Despite the existence of a wide river network, the Bas-Congolese 
face continuous difficulties accessing clean drinking water, especially in rural areas but also 
in urban areas where water and electricity provision are also sporadic and unreliable.  Despite 
these difficulties, there is little donor interest or involvement in the province due to its 
perceived affluence (state officials, NGO representatives and donors 2013 and 2014, 
interviews). 
 
Seeking to explore perceived differences between standards of living a generation ago (under 
Mobutu’s decentralisation model) and today, residents were asked to compare living 
conditions and to explain where, if at all, significant changes have taken place.  The vast 
majority (95%) of residents interviewed report that living conditions have deteriorated 
significantly over just one generation.  Three key issues are highlighted – economic 
insecurity, food insecurity and personal insecurity – notably for young women and girls.  The 
most pressing issue is the rapidly escalating cost of living combined with little or no 
remunerated job opportunities which leaves many families struggling to meet the basic 
necessities.  The logging companies which provided much employment and prosperity during 
the colonial era gradually fell into decline, ultimately closing down following Mobutu’s 
nationalisation programme in 1973, and leaving many families struggling to eke out a living 
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in agriculture.  Public sector salaries are low and unreliable – for example a primary school 
teacher earns approximately US$50 per month, yet even this is sporadic and unreliable.  
Routine expenses are considerably higher.  For example in Matadi, the provincial capital, rent 
for a regular family house with intermittent and unreliable services (water and electricity) is 
$30 per month.  Meanwhile, it costs $75 a month for just the basic foodstuffs to feed an 
average six-member family ($40 for a 50 kilogram bag of maize meal and $35 for a similar 
weight of Fufu meal).  On top of that, with teachers’ salaries often unpaid for months on end, 
all schools require ‘fees’, reported to vary between $20 to $40 per trimester.  Basic healthcare 
services, although available, prove unaffordable to many (2013, interviews).   
 
The second major issue reported by residents interviewed is food insecurity.  This is caused 
by high land rents (approx. $20-25 per annum for an average 0.25 hectare plot) and falling 
land fertility due to both overproduction and increasingly erratic weather patterns linked to 
climate change.  Almost all individuals interviewed (95%) across the 12 sample sites grow 
food – some at subsistence level and some to sell also.  This is predominantly women’s work 
and with plots generally located about five kilometres from main settlements to avoid theft, 
much time and energy is spent travelling to and fro on foot, toting heavy baskets of produce 
and tools.  There is no agricultural advisory service, there are no oxen or tractors and no 
specialist inputs are available.  Residents report extremely poor harvests (approximately 50 
per cent germination rates), in part due to poor soil fertility, and in part to escalating climatic 
perturbations as the effects of climate change are increasingly felt.  Consequently, food 
shortages are common.  Indeed, a recent study (Savy Sunda et al 2011, 36) shows that hunger 
is widespread in the province with 60 per cent of households surviving on two meals a day 
and a further nine per cent on just one meal a day.  These problems are exacerbated by the 
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reduced availability of land in recent years with significant tracts currently being appropriated 
by unspecified ‘commercial interests’ reputedly linked to the ruling Kinshasa regime (NGO 
representatives 2014, interviews)4. 
 
The third most pressing issue raised is the escalation of personal insecurity, notably gender-
based violence and rape.  Gender-based violence in the DRC is pervasive and takes many 
forms.  While the under-reporting of such incidents makes data on this extremely inaccurate, 
one report claims that 35% of women and children have suffered sexual violence; 43% 
emotional violence and 57% physical violence (UNDP, 2011, 28).  While gender-based 
violence is especially associated with the war (see, for example, Meger 2010), it is not just a 
war phenomenon and is not just concentrated in the East (Baaz and Stern 2011).  Popular 
understanding of what constitutes ‘rape’ in the Bas-Congolese context, coupled with 
strategies for addressing this belie the subordinate role of women in society.  Rape is 
understood to mean as sexual relations with a female minor (under 18 years) and appears to 
only present a problem when pregnancy ensues.  45 per cent of interviewees overall 
described incidents of rape in their communities and noted that it is very much on the 
increase.  This is ascribed to poverty and hunger (of young women and girls), together with a 
breakdown in public morality.   
 
Thus, despite its considerable wealth and resources, life for many within Bas-Congo appears 
to have become increasingly difficult.  These findings present something of a paradox.  How 
can a province with such a wealth of resources fail to provide for its inhabitants?  This is the 
subject of the following section.  
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Explaining the paradox: Accumulation through statebuilding at provincial level 
 
As we have seen above, one of the principle critiques of the liberal peacebuilding model 
employed in the DRC as elsewhere is its implicit endorsement of an ongoing predatory 
politics of extraction.  New institutions are formed, political leaders turned rebels become 
political leaders again, yet nothing fundamentally changes.  While regional stability might be 
assured, for a time at least, the result for the general population is ongoing and even increased 
economic, social and personal insecurity.  As this section demonstrates, with decentralisation 
viewed primarily as a territorial division of the spoils within the DRC, this is as true for 
provincial as for national levels.   
 
Along with national power-sharing arrangements, constitutional reform, elections, and DDR 
programmes, decentralisation constitutes one of the main components of the standard liberal 
peacebuilding toolkit.  Aimed at re-distributing power and resources, and with an emphasis 
on downwardly accountable, participative local institutions, proponents argue that it offers a 
pathway toward enhanced political legitimacy and greater political and social stability (Crook 
2003; Smoke 2003; Devas and Delay 2006; Brinkerhoff 2011).  However, in the DRC, 
decentralisation is modelled on both the South African model and the territorial process of 
1982 (Vice-Minister of the Interior 2013 interview; international donors 2013 interviews), a 
model characterised by Ngoma-Binda et al (2010, 201) as ‘...an authoritarian 
decentralisation, a parody of decentralisation, a decentralisation of façade’.  Mirroring other 
peacebuilding initiatives, the aim is a division of power and resources among the political 
elite rather than society at large.  This is evidenced in the relevant law setting out the 
structures and functions of decentralised structures (RDC 2008) where the emphasis is on 
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upward rather than downward accountability and where, unlike analogous laws elsewhere, no 
provision made for public participation in local planning or policy.  It is also evident in the 
accompanying decentralisation policy (RDC 2009) which, despite is principled commitment 
to ‘democratic practices in the management of local and provincial affairs’ and its 
‘promotion of a culture of citizen participation’ (see Objectives 3 and 10 respectively, RDC 
2009, 30-31), sets out a very limited and apolitical approach to such participation (see Gaynor 
2013, 23-29 for more detail on the legal and policy framework).  In fact, few are under any 
illusion as to what the real purpose of both the original programme and current (contested) 
moves to divide the country into 26 provinces.   
Decentralisation here, back in Sun City5, the people who were there wanted it for themselves, 
not for the population... Each one said ‘Right, I will be Governor down there and I will profit.  
We will divide the country into 26 Provinces and everyone will get a piece’.6 
 
Bas-Congo, with its vast natural resource potential, has proven particularly attractive to 
political elites in this regard.  This is manifest in ongoing political struggles between central 
and provincial elites over control and access to these resources.  On the one hand, central 
authorities in Kinshasa are said to maintain control over the distribution of power and wealth 
in the province through a system of patronage networks (2013 and 2014 NGO and donor 
interviews).  As Mayamba (2012, 44) notes, ‘In the Bas-Congo, the authorities [in Kinshasa] 
collude with business interests in a web of nepotistic networks that control of vast swathe of 
the province’s resources.’.  This is greatly facilitated by the fact that many of the key 
provincial positions such as the heads of army, police, customs and the land ministry are 
occupied by authorities from Kinshasa (2013, 2014 NGO representative interviews; see also 
Mouflet 2009 and Tull 2010 on this).  On the other hand, Bas-Congolese provincial 
authorities are at the forefront of the so-called ‘retrocession’ debate – calling for the retention 
of 40 per cent of provincial resources within the province as set out in Constitutional Article 
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175.  More recently, following significant obstacles and delays, the Bas-Congolese succeeded 
in gaining control of the Governership as locally elected Jacques Mbadu ousted Kinshasa’s 
favourite Déo Nkusu who, Vice-Governor since 2003 and Acting-Governor following the 
election of the sitting Governor to national parliament, rejected the outcome of provincial 
elections7.  Notwithstanding this victory, the new Governor is now reported to also be in 
Kinshasa’s pocket (2014 NGO representative interviews). 
 
In Bas-Congo, the Governor governs over 10 ministers and an elected Provincial Assembly 
of 29 deputies who, in theory, serve a five year term.  Elections were last held in 2006 and are 
now overdue.  Following much debate and pressure, recently (February 12th, 2015)) the 
National Electoral Commission published a calendar of elections which indicates that local 
elections will take now place on October 25th, 2015 (CENI 2015).  In theory, the role of the 
Assembly is to approve the provincial budget and control the executive.  However, it suffers 
a number of shortcomings in this regard.  It is highly stratified and dominated by powerful 
and experienced senior members.  Newer members rarely, if ever, speak and members are 
reported to be more concerned with supplementing their income and profiting personally 
from their position and status (2013 donor and NGO representative ints.).  There is no 
administrative support to the Provincial Assembly as the national Ministry responsible – the 
Ministry of Public Services is in complete disarray having had six different Ministers over the 
last five years (2013, int. Ex-state official).  These issues notwithstanding, agreement was 
reached in July 2012 to devolve four key Ministries (health, education, agriculture and rural 
development, and the environment) to provincial level.  Technical support (in public 
expenditure management) is being provided through a World Bank and UNDP sponsored 
programme8 and, amid considerable confusion over the division of roles and responsibilities 
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(and hence resources) between provincial and more local levels, this devolution is due to be 
rolled out in February 2014 (2013, 2014 interviews).   
 
Thus, technical supports notwithstanding, elite control and manipulation of the Assembly 
leaves it largely unaccountable and responsive to the public and, therefore, ineffective in 
addressing structural deficits and inequalities across the province.  The public has not heard 
from or seen Provincial Deputies since the election campaign (tellingly termed ‘propaganda’ 
in Bas-Congo) and an overwhelming sense of frustration with and lack of faith in current 
institutions is palpable as residents describe how their authorities care only for their own 
interests and are neither willing nor capable of bringing the much needed employment and 
factories back to the province.   
 
It’s a problem of Directors [those that govern], in the level of the Provincial Government.  
The money comes but it never comes to the base.  The Directors of this country work for their 
families only... Before they were honest, now they lie, they are selfish. 
(Participant FG women, Mayunda) 
 
 
The money that they [Provincial Deputies] get in the Province office over there, it’s to 
send their children to school and to live well... All the money they get, it’s for their 
own lives, to go to Europe etc.  They don’t care a bit about us.   
       (Participant, FG women, Ntomba3) 
 
 
 
 
The lack of provincial authorities’ responsiveness to local needs is further evidenced by a 
comparison of provincial priorities as reflected in the Provincial Action Plan (PAP) (GP, 
2011) and those of residents where a clear mismatch in priorities is apparent.  As outlined in 
the previous section, the three areas of economic, food and personal insecurity constitute the 
principle priorities of local communities.  An analysis of the PAP however reveals relatively 
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low levels of support in these areas, yet high levels of investment in the systems and 
structures of rent extraction - governance structures themselves and mining.  These priorities 
are echoed in interviews with both the Provincial Minister of the Interior and Cabinet 
Directors in the Governance office who also stress the importance of roads for transportation 
of resources (2013, interviews). 
 
The PAP is a comprehensive plan setting out all the programmes the provincial government 
envisages for the province over the 5 year time frame 2011-2016.  Given the lack of 
transparency around Assembly debates and decision-making, together with the lack of 
documentation in this respect, it is the sole document which provides some indication of 
provincial government policy.  Comprising four pillars, it includes figures on overall budgets, 
budgets secured and funding sources (state, province or other funders).  While the overall 
budgets for different programmes do not necessarily give an indication of priority (as certain 
activities simply cost more than others), the percentage of provincial spending for secured 
budgets potentially does9.   Specifically, a 100 per cent spend is taken here to indicate a high 
priority while a 0 per cent spend is taken to indicate a low or non-existent priority. Although, 
as the PAP contains no narrative section and it is unclear what exact actions are intended by 
the different headings, most headings are sufficiently self-explanatory to give a good 
indication of provincial government priorities.   
 
 
Of the four pillars set out in the PAP, ‘Good governance and peace promotion’ has secured 
the most funding (80 per cent of its overall budget).  Within this, the highest provincial spend 
(100 per cent funding from the province) is on ‘improvements in administrative governance’ 
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while there is a 0 per cent spend on ‘local development promotion’ and ‘justice and security’.  
The second pillar, ‘Economic diversification, growth acceleration and jobs promotion’ – one 
of clear relevance to communities – has secured just 37 per cent of its overall budget.  The 
provincial government is focusing its resources in two areas – ‘systems management’ and 
‘improving mining revenues’.  While the latter area may provide some local jobs, given the 
extractive patterns seen elsewhere in the country, it is unlikely to bring any significant 
benefits to local communities.  Contrarily, the two areas attracting no provincial support are 
the ‘development of provincial industries’ and the ‘development of local tourism’ – both of 
which have significantly more capacity to generate local employment – a core priority for 
local communities.  The third pillar, ‘Improvements in access to social services and human 
capacity building’, has secured 43 per cent of its overall budget, with provincial resources 
focused in the somewhat arbitrary areas of ‘sport and leisure activities’, the ‘valorisation of 
provincial cultural patrimony’ and ‘the improvement of rural habitat’.  Meanwhile, social 
welfare programmes including ‘social protection for widows and orphans’, ‘protection for 
children and vulnerable groups’ and ‘assessment of HIV impact’ are receiving no provincial 
funding.  Finally, the fourth pillar, ‘Protection of the environment and fight against climate 
change’ – again, a clear priority for communities facing falling and failing harvests, has 
secured just one per cent of its overall budget, and all provincial resources are focused on 
adaptation rather than mitigation strategies, together with risk management in the event of 
environmental disasters.  Taken together, the findings from the PAP analysis appear to 
reinforce the perceptions of FG participants and individual interviewees – that provincial 
authorities appear more focused on personal enrichment and resource extraction than on the 
needs and exigencies of their constituents. 
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Overall, the analysis presented in this section reveals a mismatch between the priorities of 
provincial authorities and those of local communities.  This indicates a low level of 
responsiveness and effectiveness of provincial structures vis à vis community needs.  This, 
combined with the predominantly negative public perceptions of their motivations, points to 
low levels of public legitimacy of these provincial level structures and agents.  In the 
following section we turn to an examination of the effectiveness of more local governance 
structures in this regard. 
 
 
 
 
Beyond the province: The efficacy of more localised governance structures 
 
While planned local elections have yet to take place10, local governance structures 
comprising a mix of appointed, informally elected and traditional authorities and closely 
resembling those of the Mobutu era are in place at a range of local levels.  At what is known 
as the ETD (Decentralised Territorial Entities) level, authorities include town mayors and 
bourgmestres as well as sector chiefs in rural areas.  Of all levels of local governance, these 
authorities are the least familiar local communities however (just 23 per cent of interviewees 
– 11 per cent urban, 29 per cent rural – professed to some idea of their role).  Among the 23 
per cent of interviewees with some idea of their role, they are viewed as remote 
administrators reporting to provincial level authorities and imposing fines and penalties on 
populations on their behalf.  Despite their relative remoteness however, a number of donors 
(including the CTB, DfID, the UNDP and USAID) supporting efforts in other provinces are 
now focusing their support at this level in the belief that these authorities can more 
effectively manage local conflicts and development (2013 interviews). 
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At more local (sub-ETD) levels again, a bewildering complex web of local structures and 
leaders – both formal and informal – operate.  Some of these are appointed by ETD 
authorities (neighbourhood chiefs, locality chiefs, agglomeration chiefs and avenue chiefs) 
and some constitute traditional positions of power (village chiefs, land chiefs, group chiefs) 
which remain within particular clans passing from uncle to nephew.  Some are paid positions 
and some are not (generally those at the most local levels).   In addition to these authorities 
who, traditional or not, sit within the formal political structure which has been in place since 
Mobutu’s time (indeed, a number of local authorities interviewed have held their offices since 
this time), other local leaders identified are religious leaders, teachers and, to a lesser extent, 
NGO representatives11.   
 
Leaders and authorities at the most local, sub-ETD level, living within their communities, are 
well known to all.  Their roles are twofold – communal problem-solving (on issues such as 
water provision, electricity provision for urban dwellers, roadworks following heavy rains 
etc), and local conflict resolution (2013, ints., FGs).  They thus fulfil a potentially invaluable 
role in mitigating the consequences and addressing some of the underlying causes of 
economic and social exclusion.  Yet, as the findings below demonstrate, their effectiveness in 
these areas is somewhat limited in a number of respects.  In relation to problems with 
communal services, less than a third of interviewees (10 percent urban, 41 per cent rural) 
claim that they approach their local leaders when there is a problem.  Twenty-eight per cent 
(39 per cent urban, 21 per cent rural) abandon the service altogether.  A number of abandoned 
water pumps were observed over the course of fieldwork and all interviewees in urban areas 
enjoy sporadic electricity supply with a number having gone without electricity for between 
three and six months despite receiving monthly bills for the service.  Eleven per cent of 
interviewees (same urban and rural) have attempted to resolve problems themselves in 
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collaboration with their neighbours.  This often involves seeking financial contributions from 
each household for the costs of parts for water pumps, electric cables, transformers etc.  
However, as one FG participant outlines below, increasingly it has come to involve more 
confrontational methods also.   
 
The problem is there is just one [electricity] line... and we are all on this one line.  We send it 
[electricity] to neighbouring countries, but here it is blocked.  And so now we are back to 
candles.  We have gone many times to the SNEL12 office but it never works.  So what we do 
now, each time one of these [SNEL officials] comes with a bill, we have started to hit them.  
We have understood that complaints will get us nowhere.  So when these people come we beat 
them up...  That’s our solution 
      (Participant 1 from Avenue A, FG men, Soyo) 
 
 
 
 
More broadly, asked about their own personal engagement with local authorities, it is striking 
how many people have never consulted with them on any issue.  Overall, just 18 per cent 
(with slightly more men than women and no significant urban/rural differences) of all 
interviewees have ever consulted a local leader.  Delving into the reasons for this reluctance 
to involve local leaders despite a high level of awareness of their role, interviews and FG 
discussions revealed that this is because a) the costs prove prohibitive (‘voluntary’ 
contributions run from the cost of a case of Primus beer (approximately $15) upward 
depending on the issue and how many leaders become involved); and b), in relation to their 
role in local conflict resolution, a reticence to publicise issues which may be contained 
among the parties involved13.  Of those that have consulted (or been summoned by) local 
authorities, cases have involved disputes with neighbours – usually over children’s 
misdemeanours; husbands/wives sleeping with others; cases of domestic violence; theft; and 
land disputes.  The costs incurred in these cases, all of which involved local, sub-ETD 
authorities, ranged from US$ 50 to US$ 200.  While certainly off-putting, these costs are 
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significantly lower than those enforced by authorities at higher levels (the police and court 
system are particularly onerous) where costs escalate rapidly and justice is clearly the 
preserve of the powerful and wealthy.  Of note however, in relation to locally treated issues, 
while these cases are regarded as ‘resolved’ in the sense that local chiefs have made their 
rulings, the underlying conflicts remain or, in some cases, have clearly intensified (ints. 
2013).  In the range of cases detailed by interview and focus group participants, relations 
remain strained and the respective parties continue to avoid each other.  
 
As the findings set out in this section have shown, there is little public knowledge of the role 
or function of ETD level administrators.  Meanwhile, the most local (sub-ETD) level 
authorities, while well known, nonetheless prove relatively ineffective in assisting local 
communities to deal with the hardships and difficulties encountered daily.  And in contrast to 
accounts of daily life in the East of the country14, there is scant evidence in Bas-Congo of 
parallel forms of governance or coping strategies within the challenging socio-political 
climate.  While efforts are made by local communities to address deficiencies and failures on 
service delivery, the problems often persist or re-surface.  Moreover, while local authority 
interventions in local conflicts may appear to resolve these with fines imposed upon one or 
more parties, underlying tensions and animosities remain long after the supposed ‘resolution’.  
In effect, local authorities are reproducing and perpetuating the economic and political 
exclusion of communities from elite networks of power and influence by somewhat 
ineffectively trying to manage rather than transform the social fallout of this exclusion.  The 
social consequences of this are examined in more detail in the following section. 
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The consequences of exclusion: Structural violence and social breakdown 
 
Both the relative ineffectiveness of local governance and the ongoing political, economic and 
social exclusion of both local leaders and communities result in three main social 
consequences.  The first is the escalation of jealousy and hatred within and between families.  
FG participants from two different sites outline the issue. 
The problem is poverty.  If everyone works, no one can be jealous of the other.  When there is 
a lack of jobs - me, I get up in the morning. I am at home and there is nothing [no food] in the 
house.  The other, he gets up also.  Perhaps he eats some bread.  I sit there and watch him.  
And he, he looks up and says, “me, i’m eating eh?”.  And this can cause hatred .   
      (Participant FG men, Tshela Centre) 
 
If you have work, you won’t have hatred against the neighbours.  You will have everything 
you need for life, for the house. 
       (Participant FG men, Mayunda) 
 
 
 
In the absence of other outlets, the escalating levels of material depravation are causing 
residents to turn on each other.  The social and psychological implications for the Bas-
Congolese constitutes one of the principle and most damaging symptoms of structural 
violence whereby institutionalised inequalities, including unequal access to employment, 
services and to basic rights, may result in psychological and emotional damage (Galtung 
1969).  With distrust and animosity growing within communities, explanations for day to day 
difficulties are increasingly sought in the spiritual realm where, residents report, the 
incidences of good fortune being sourced or stolen are on the increase (2013, interviews 
FGs).  An intervention from a female focus group participant from a site in Matadi town, 
speaking of changes which have taken place over time, illustrates this trend. 
 
 
There are those who seem to be generous.  They give you money.  But in the spiritual realm, 
they recuperate this.  He comes and gives you presents.  But at the spiritual level he takes this 
back.  It’s perhaps your luck.  When he comes he takes your luck.  He becomes more and 
more rich because he has taken all your luck.  
(Participant FG women, Belvedere) 
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A FG participant from Mayunda expresses the phenomenon succinctly when she confidently 
states that ‘To do well today, you need to be an occultist.’, thereby profiting at another’s 
expense.   
 
Second, and related to this escalation of jealousy and hatred, is the growth in local conflicts 
and tensions.  The principle source of conflict identified by research participants (46 per cent 
of all interviewees – 75 per cent urban, 30 per cent rural) is jealousy leading to ‘calumnous’ 
allegations15, with these often linked to allegations of witchcraft and occultist interference.  
As the figures cited show, this is particularly prevalent in urban areas.  The next major source 
of conflict (cited by 17 per cent of interviewees) is land, with frequent conflicts over 
ownership and ancestral rights.  This, predictably, is more prevalent in rural than urban sites 
(24 percent versus three per cent respectively).  One NGO offering legal services reports that 
60 per cent of cases in the local courts are land-related (2013, interview) with these cases 
ending up in court when one of the parties possesses sufficient means to purchase justice.    
The high propensity for antagonism and conflict over relatively minor matters is possibly best 
illustrated by the fact that many people (13 per cent of interviewees overall with no 
significant difference between urban and rural sites) cite young childrens’ minor 
misdemeanours (incurred through play) as another common source of conflict.  And as many 
of the detailed cases outlined over the course of the research attest, a relatively minor incident 
can end up incurring significant financial and social costs to all parties if it ends up being 
dealt with by formal local authorities.  Another source of conflict is ‘polygamy’ – in this 
instance referring to when a spouse sleeps with someone else’s spouse.  This, interviewees 
claim, is symptomatic of acute poverty (women sleep with other men for money and/or food; 
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men of means accumulate mistresses); domestic conflict and violence; rivalries between 
women; and a general social breakdown in norms and morality.   
 
This leads on to the third issue which is the perceived breakdown in social norms around 
sexual violence and rape. As noted previously, gender-based violence in the DRC is 
pervasive and takes many forms. This is linked by many to the breakdown in family 
structures and norms coupled with the power and wealth of political status and prestige.  As 
one focus group participant explains: 
 
There was more morality before.  Papa worked and was paid.  And so the children obeyed 
their Mother and Papa.  Today their Papa has no work, the children do not obey.  Because 
their Papa is not working and the parents are not in a position to look after their children.  
And the government, because of these events, makes our children their ‘girlfriends’ [petites 
chéries] and it’s a disaster.  All these fat Papas, these fat Monsieurs...  
 
(Participant FG women, Soyo) 
 
 
The culpability of the political elite for this state of affairs is clearly articulated in the 
following angry response in relation to this issue... 
The children are chased from school [because they do not have their ‘fee’].  When they are 
chased like that they are on the street.  They meet with a man who has some money.  There, 
there will be a rape.  Now all this falls on the head of the parents, ‘she was raped, she was 
raped’.  But it’s the state that is responsible.  If there are rapes, it is the state that is 
responsible for that.  So the state needs to take now all the mechanisms necessary so that 
children are not chased from school because of 5,000 francs for a library...  
        (Participant FG men, Tshela) 
 
While some commentators (for example, Trefon 2013) rightly highlight the importance of 
individual and community agency and coping strategies in the face of acute political and 
economic marginalisation, the findings presented here highlight the relative paucity and 
ineffectiveness of these within the Bas-Congolese context.  It would appear that the potent 
combination of acute social breakdown and distrust in the context of entrenched traditional 
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structures have undermined any popular capacity and will for parallel strategies.  Within Bas-
Congo, even church leaders and the small number of NGOs that exist work out of the service 
provision model highlighted more broadly in the Congolese context by Bilak (2009) with, as 
in virtually all aspects of social life, patron-client relations determining the targeting and 
provision of services and supports.  The overall picture that emerges therefore is one of acute 
social disintegration with communities turning inward among themselves in the absence of 
political channels through which they may express their frustration and anger.  While the 
BDK – a politico-religious movement which led popular protests against the central state in 
the late 2000s (see Tull 2010) once provided an outlet for such anger, its activism has 
declined in recent years as a number of its leaders are reported to have been incorporated into 
the provincial administration (2013, interviews with the Provincial Minister of the Interior 
and three Cabinet Directors) while others have been arrested or have become increasingly 
marginalised16. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: From conflict containment to transformation 
The findings from this case study on local governance in Bas-Congo province serve to 
reinforce the arguments of others (for example Englebert and Tull 2008; Marriage 2011; 
Prunier 2011) that peacebuilding in the DRC is largely focused on regional and not local 
security concerns and therefore continues to ignore and, by omission, exacerbate conditions 
of structural violence on the ground.  As we have seen in Bas-Congo, provincial authorities 
remain remote and unresponsive to the priorities of their constituents.  Predatory politics 
continues as usual, with the battle for the spoils simply now transferred from national to 
provincial levels.  At more local (ETD) levels, officials remain equally remote from the 
population, while more immediate (sub-ETD) leaders and chiefs, although well-known, are 
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infrequently consulted by residents.  When these leaders are consulted, this is to address local 
conflicts.  Yet, while these conflicts are addressed through the imposition of fines and 
penalties on one or both parties, they are not necessarily resolved and, in some cases, they are 
exacerbated resulting in increased tensions and animosities between respective parties.   
 
This indicates that the most local, sub-ETD governance structures are serving as systems of 
conflict management and control rather than attempting to address the underlying structural 
causes of these local conflicts.  Put simply, their role is conflict containment rather than 
transformation.  With linkages upward to ETD levels restricted to reporting alone (a purely 
administrative role), there is no accountable follow-up on reported incidents and no way of 
ensuring that their root causes are addressed.  Meanwhile, the processes and mechanisms of 
structural, psychological, and physical violence continue – most notably for victims of sexual 
violence and for the poor who cannot afford to buy justice.  This leads to rising levels of 
frustration and anger with communities, in the absence of appropriate political channels, 
turning on themselves in frustration.   
 
Looking to the future, there are three principal conclusions which can be drawn from these 
findings.  These relate to the respective issues of state legitimacy, structural violence, and 
what local ownership means in this context.  In relation to the first issue, public trust in and 
legitimacy of the state is low to non-existent.  This is not just at national level, but also at 
provincial and more local levels.  And this is not just an issue of party or factional politics.  It 
is one of wider legitimacy and widespread distrust and dissatisfaction with the motivations 
and actions of the political elite.  In the relative absence of any notion or structures of 
downward accountability or responsiveness to local concerns and constituents, political 
leadership at all levels remains associated with personal wealth consolidation.  In this 
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context, it appears highly unlikely that the 40 per cent ‘retrocession’ revenue inscribed in 
Constitutional Article 175 and advocated by a number of commentators and NGOs will prove 
of any benefit to local communities.  Moreover, for international donor agencies who, within 
the popular liberal tradition, place much of their faith in local elections as a means towards 
increasingly local political accountability, the record in this regard to date at national and 
provincial levels provides little substance to such faith.  In the current climate there is no 
reason to believe that the considerable pre-election manipulation and election day 
irregularities of 2011 (see Carter Center 2011) will not be replicated at local levels as local 
powerbrokers vie for their respective share of the pie.  The propensity for local elections to 
increase local level tensions and conflicts should also be noted.    
 
The second important conclusion drawn, in particular from the local level findings from Bas-
Congo, is that the conditions for structural violence are currently in place and escalating.  It is 
a source of significant anger and frustration that a province with such wealth (three billion 
barrels of oil sold per annum; the country’s only ports through which all manufactured good 
pass; vast mineral and forest resources; potentially the largest hydro-electric dam in the 
world) provides such dismal opportunities and life chances for its population.  A channel is 
needed for this anger.  While, as noted previously, the BDK provided a channel for public 
anger in the late 2000s, its activities have waned significantly in recent years.  In the absence 
of effective political structures through which this anger and frustration can be channelled, it 
is manifesting in an atmosphere of jealousy and animosity with citizens turning on each other 
in anger. And, as Galtung (1969) and his followers have outlined, structural violence is 
closely linked to physical violence and local grievances can readily spill over into more 
widespread conflict, thereby igniting and fuelling both local and national instability. 
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The third conclusion relates to what local ownership might mean within this context.  Can 
decentralised political structures currently in place help mitigate the conditions of structural 
and physical violence and assist in building state legitimacy and trust?  In their current form, 
this appears unlikely.  Why?  First, conceived principally as a power-sharing mechanism for 
factional elites, the current decentralisation legislation and framework, as well as its practice 
on the ground, make no real provision for local accountability or participation – key pre-
requisites for local ownership.  In both formal and informal (sub-ETD level) structures and 
mechanisms, access is differential and based on wealth, status, connections and, depending 
on the issue, gender.  Second, all of the formal structures (including ETD level) remain at a 
remove and isolated from ordinary people.  Their role has not changed since Mobutu’s time 
and they retain a purely administrative role, reporting upward through the hierarchy and 
holding no accountability to their communities.  Might this change with the long promised 
local elections?  Not without a radical change in political culture including concrete 
mechanisms and spaces where constituents can hold representatives to account on a regular 
basis.  This means thinking beyond elections to more regularised fora of debate and 
exchange.  Third, leaders and authorities at sub-ETD level remain focused on conflict 
containment not transformation.  Therefore, as noted above, the conditions for structural 
violence remain and, in some cases, as conditions continue to deteriorate, are escalating.   
 
An important question is whether this phenomenon remains unique to Bas-Congo or whether 
it is replicated across other provinces also.  Unfortunately, the lack of detailed empirical 
studies across other provinces (with the exception of the Eastern and North-Eastern provinces 
where the focus is more on large-scale rather than low-lying conflict) makes it difficult to 
make a definitive assessment in this regard.  What can be said is that the continued lack of 
downward accountability or upward citizen participation which characterises decentralisation 
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models elsewhere (e.g. neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda – see Gaynor 2014a; 2014b – and 
in South Africa where the current Congolese model was conceived – see Heller 2001; 2009) 
pose significant challenges to decentralisation’s potential for the inter-related issues of local 
development and conflict mitigation.  The lessons from decentralisation experiments 
elsewhere indicate that, for decentralisation to yield substantive, transformative outcomes, 
lower class demands need to be organised through a combination of new, left-of-centre 
political configurations borne of popular struggles such as in South Africa, Kerala in India 
and Brazil (see Heller 2001; 2009) and a rich and dense tapestry of local, grassroots-based 
civic associations (see Gaynor 2014a).  In the continued absence of these in Bas-Congo, the 
future looks somewhat bleak.   
 
Clearly the challenges to building and supporting responsive, effective local governance 
mechanisms are significant.  But so too are the dangers in not doing so.  As all in the Great 
Lakes region know, history has proven that it is a grave mistake to ignore local frustrations 
and tensions.  These can build and manifest into major violence and conflict destabilising 
entire regions and peoples.  Greater attention by all, including the international donor 
community, to the more transformative potential of local governance mechanisms and 
practices might well be one step towards attaining greater stability and development within 
the region.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Interviewees were randomly selected on transect walks across the sites as the third adult man/woman 
encountered.   
2 Unlike elsewhere, the existing territorial boundaries of the province have been retained within the 
(contested) new territorial reconfiguration. 
3 See http://biofreshblog.com/2011/11/23/dr-congo-and-south-africa-sign-pact-to-implement-40000-mw-
grand-inga-dam/; see also Showers (2009).   
4 This phenomenon consists of traces of land in the tens of thousands of hectares being appropriated from 
local residents, fenced off and protected by armed security.  Although provincial authorities report that the land 
is being used for crops and livestock production, residents are sceptical.  The frequency of helicopter and 
airplane traffic onto these sites together with the frequency of President Kabila’s visits to the province are 
leading to growing unease and tension locally as residents fear similar consequences to the land and resource 
disputes in Eastern DRC. 
5 Sun City, in South Africa, is where peace negotiations were brokered in 2002.  
6 Interview officials within the National Assembly, January 18th.  
7 See http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/10/31/ffrttyyyjjjkkllmmmm/ for more background on this. 
8 COREF – Comité d’Orientation de la Reforme des Finances Publiques 
9 Although this may also be influenced by the willingness of other sources (state and external funders) to 
contribute also.  However, a fuller analysis of the data (conducted by the author but not included here due to 
space constraints) reveals that the Province has committed to full (100 per cent) funding of some programmes 
yet no (0 per cent) funding of others which have attracted no funds from elsewhere either, thereby indicating 
that some priorities are identified independent of other funders at provincial level. 
10 While the national Vice Minister of the Interior (in charge of Decentralisation) claimed that these would 
take place in 2013 (2013 int.), more sceptical commentators (2013 ints.) have been proven correct and local 
(sub-provincial) elections are still pending.   
11 As noted previously, there is little international donor intervention in Bas-Congo.  Consequently, local 
NGO presence is similarly somewhat scarce.  NGOs which do operate in the province follow the broader trend 
outlined by Bilak (2009) of service provision rather than more political interventions aimed at addressing the 
broader structural causes of poverty and marginalisation (2013, int. César Ngimbi, CRONG - Coordination 
Regionale des ONGs de Développement). 
12 Société Nationale d’Electricité / National Electricity company 
13 If issues are brought to local authorities, a public resolution procedure ensues whereby all parties to the 
dispute/issue have a right to present their side within a public forum. 
14 See, in particular, the 2013 special issue of Review of African Political Economy – 40(135). 
15 ‘Calumny’ is the deliberate maligning of somebody’s character by spreading damaging 
stories/lies/rumours about them.  It is reported to be particularly prevalent among women. 
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16 See ‘Arrestation de vingt membres de « Bundu dia Mayala »’, February 15th, 2013, 
http://www.acpcongo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6459:arrestation-de-vingt-
membres-de-l-bundu-dia-mayala-r&catid=35:nation&Itemid=56; see also ‘RDC : Ne Muanda Nsemi se 
rapproche de Tshisekedi’, http://afrikarabia2.blogs.courrierinternational.com/archive/2010/12/16/rdc-ne-
muanda-nsemi-se-rapproche-de-tshisekedi.html, December 16th, 2010. 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
KINSHASA 
Government officials 
National Vice Minister of Interior, Decentralisation and Customary Affairs,  19.1.2013. 
National Coordinator of CTAD (Cellule Technique Appui à la Décentralisation, 15.1.2013. 
Senior official from Gender Ministry, 15.1.2013. 
Technical advisors in the National Assembly, 18.1.2013. 
MP in national government, 7.1.2014. 
 
 
Donor representatives 
EU, 15.1.2013. 
World Bank, 16.1.2013. 
UNDP, 18.1.2013. 
DfID, 14.1.2013. 
ODI, 14.1.2013. 
USAID/DAI, 15.1.2013. 
Coopération Belge, 17.1.2013.  
 
 
Representatives of civil society organisations 
CEJP (Commission Episcopal pour la Justice et Paix), 14.1.2013 
CONAFED (Comité Nationale des Femme et du Développement), 16.1.2013 
Trócaire, 17.1.2013. 
Christian Aid, 14.1.2013 and 7.1.2014. 
International Rescue Committee, 15.1.2013. 
 
 
BAS CONGO 
 
Government officials 
Provincial Minister of the Interior, Territorial Administration and Customary Affairs, Matadi, 
21.1.2013. 
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Provincial Cabinet Directors, Matadi, 21.1.2013. 
 
 
Civil society activists 
Coordinator CRONG (Coordination Regionale des ONGs de Developpement), 22.1.2013. 
Director CEJP Matadi, 29.1.2013 and 8.1.2014. 
Governance programme officer CEJP Matadi, 20.1.2013 and 9.1.2014 
Director Inter-Action Tshela, 6.2.2013 and 9.1.2014. 
Governance programme officer Inter-Action Tshela 31.1.2013 and 10.1.2014. 
 
Local authorities 
Sector and Group Chiefs - Nsanga village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 23.1.2013 
Agglomeration Chief, KuaKua village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 24.1.2013 
Village chief, Kirizou Nhanda 3 village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 25.1.2013 
Quartier Chief, Soyo quartier, Matadi commune, Matadi town, 29.1.2013 
Locality Chief, Ntombo3 village, Lubuzi sector, Tshela territory, 31.1.2013 
Group Chief, Mayunda village, Mbanga sector, Tshela territory, 5.2.2013. 
 
 
Residents – Focus  groups 
Belvedere quartier, Nzanza commune, Matadi town, 21.1.2013 & 22.1.2013 
Nsanga village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 23.1.2013  & 24.1.2013 
Kionzo village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 18.2.2013 & 19.2.2013 
Lukimba village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory 21.2.2013 & 22.2.2013 
KuaKua village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 24.1.2013 & 25.1.2013 
Soyo quartier, Matadi commune, Matadi town, 28.1.2013 
Kirizou Nhanda 3 village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 25.1.2013 
Ntombo3 village, Lubuzi sector, Tshela town, 31.1.2013 & 1.2.2013 
Tshela centre, Tshela commune, Tshela town, 1.2.2013 & 2.2.2013 
Mayunda village, Mbanga sector, Tshela territory, 4.2.2013 & 5.2.2013 
Loango Kumbi village, Loango sector, Tshela territory, 12.2.2013 & 13.2.2013 
Kasadi village, Bula Naku sector, Tshela territory, 14.2.2013 & 15.2.2013 
Kithadi village, Lubuzi sector, Tshela territory, 16.2.2013 
 
 
Residents – individual interviews 
Belvedere quartier, Nzanza commune, Matadi town, 21.1.2013 & 22.1.2013 
Nsanga village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 23.1.2013 & 24.1.2013 
Kionzo village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 18.2.2013 & 19.2.2013 
Lukimba village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory 21.2.2013 & 22.2.2013 
KuaKua village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 24.1.2013 & 25.1.2013 
Kirizou Nhanda 3 village, Lufu sector, Seke Banza territory, 25.1.2013 
Soyo quartier, Matadi commune, Matadi town, 29.1.2013 
Ntombo3 village, Lubuzi sector, Tshela town, 31.1.2013 
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Tshela centre, Tshela commune, Tshela town, 2.2.2013 & 6.2.2013 
Mayunda village, Mbanga sector, Tshela territory, 4.2.2013 & 5.2.2013 
Loango Kumbi village, Loango sector, Tshela territory, 12.2.2013 & 13.2.2013 
Kasadi village, Bula Naku sector, Tshela territory, 14.2.2013 & 15.2.2013 
Kithadi village, Lubuzi sector, Tshela territory, 15.2.2013 
 
 
 
 
